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This paper presents a model of the interaction between two rival firms based in the same 
country. Each firm must decide how to serve a foreign market (export or foreign production) 
and  how  much  to  invest  in  a  corporate-wide  asset  that  reduces  production  costs  and/or 
augments the willingness-to-pay for their product. In this scenario, the firms’ foreign direct 
investment decisions are interdependent. Furthermore, strategic motives for FDI relate not to 
a firm’s domestic, as well as foreign, market profits. One possibility is that a firm sets up 
overseas production even though its foreign market profits would be higher by exporting. 
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1.  Introduction 
Standard explanations of foreign direct investment (FDI) focus upon two motives: to lower 
the cost of supplying a market; and/or to improve access to some foreign market(s) (see 
Caves,  1996  for  an  overview).  However,  the  theory  of  the  multinational  firm  also 
accommodates  other,  complementary  motives  for  FDI  that  derive  from  the  strategic 
imperative for a firm to influence the behaviour of its rivals insofar as it is possible and that 
influence can be exerted to achieve a more beneficial outcome for the firm. In this paper, we 
highlight a possible strategic motive for FDI, such that: a firm may be motivated to set-up 
foreign production because by doing so they reduce a rival firm’s commitment of resources to 
a corporate-wide investment that has a cost-reducing, and/or demand augmenting, effect. As 
the investment deterred has a corporate-wide impact on the rival, this effect of FDI serves to 
augment the firm’s performance in the home, as well and the foreign, market. Indeed, even if 
the fixed cost of FDI is large enough to ensure that the firm’s profits from serving the foreign 
market would be higher by exporting, the firm may nevertheless set-up a foreign plant. They 
do so because FDI is associated with an improvement in their home market profits – this is 
the scenario alluded to in the title.
1 
The international expansion of production activities is overwhelmingly associated with 
relatively large firms that tend to serve relatively large shares of the national markets in 
which  they  operate.  After  all,  such  a  strategy  is  accompanied  by  substantial  resource 
requirements  in  capital,  managerial  expertise  and  time,  and  so  on.  Also,  a  firm  must 
overcome any disadvantage associated with its (at least initial) relative unfamiliarity and/or 
incompatibility  with  the  foreign  production  environment,  as  compared  to  the  indigenous 
industry. Therefore, firms that sustain multinational production are those that hold the firm-
specific assets (of whatever kind) that secure a strong, perhaps dominant, presence in the 
market (Teece, 1986; Dunning, 1988). As a result, it is unsurprising that, in recent years, a   4 
notable academic literature has developed to explore the influence of market power on the 
evolution of multinational firms. Specifically, it has become more widely acknowledged that 
companies’ foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions can be importantly interdependent, i.e. 
that one firm’s FDI decision can be importantly influenced by the corresponding choice of a 
rival firm. 
One  mechanism  through  which  such  interdependence  can  arise  is  proposed  by 
Knickerbocker (1973), who sought to explain the apparent clustering of FDI observed among 
US firms. He proposed that if one of a group of rival oligopolists sets-up production facilities 
overseas, uncertain foreign cost economies will threaten the status-quo in all markets (at 
home and abroad, if the firms initially export). Risk-averse rival firms would then seek to 
minimise the prospect of upsetting the balance of competition by replicating an initial FDI by 
one  of  their  number,  i.e.  there  is  an  incentive  for  follow-my-leader  behaviour.  This 
mechanism, which requires the presence of oligopoly, uncertainty and risk aversion, has since 
been formalised by Head et al. (2002). Also, Leahy and Pavelin (2003) formally illustrate an 
alternative mechanism for positive interdependence between firms’ FDI, i.e. that one firm 
undertaking FDI increases the incentive for rival firms to follow suit. They show that, without 
uncertainty about the foreign production environment or risk aversion, firms may engage in 
follow-my-leader  FDI  because  of  foreign  cost  advantages  that  would  threaten  tacit, 
oligopolistic collusion if FDI was not replicated across firms. 
An alternative approach employs an analysis of oligopoly that disregards risk-aversion 
and presumes complete information and non-cooperative behaviour. Seminal contributions in 
this area include those made by Smith (1987), Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and Motta 
(1992). That literature, upon which this paper builds and to which it contributes, reveals the 
tendency  in  FDI  for  negative  interdependence  between  firms,  i.e.  the  firms’  actions  are 
strategic substitutes. The underlying mechanism derives from the characterisation of FDI as a   5 
fixed cost (of building a foreign plant) in exchange for per-unit saving (on a transport cost 
and/or  tariff  associated  with  exporting),  and  the  fact  that  if  a  firm  undertakes  FDI,  the 
foreign-dedicated output of that firm is larger and that of its rival is smaller, ceteris paribus. 
Therefore,  by  undertaking  FDI,  a  firm  decreases  its  rival’s  incentive  to  follow  suit  by 
reducing that firm’s optimal foreign-dedicated output and so decreasing the number of units 
across which it must recover the fixed cost of overseas operations. This interdependence 
gives rise to a potential strategic motive for FDI: when FDI by one firm deters FDI by a rival, 
this makes FDI more attractive for the former as it increases the profitability of its serving of 
the foreign market through local production. 
As  outlined  previously,  we  will  show  that  the  range  of  strategic  motives  for  FDI 
available to a firm is expanded by the addition of investment in some corporate-wide asset. In 
this connection, there is an extensive literature that discusses the complementary relationship 
between FDI and research and development (R&D) activities. Some have focussed upon the 
role  of  innovatory  leadership  in  providing  the  firm-specific advantages necessary  for  the 
internationalisation of the firm (Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1977 and 1981; Petit and Sanna-
Randaccio,  1998);  others  have  focussed  upon  the  within-firm  internationalisation  of  the 
innovation process (Archibugi and Michie, 1995; Cantwell, 1992 and 1995; Cantwell and 
Piscitello, 1999 and 2000; Granstrand and Sjolander, 1992; Kuemmerle, 1999; Zander, 1997). 
Most pertinently, Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) and Sanna-Randaccio (2002) propose a 
formal theoretical model of the interaction between these two corporate behaviours in an 
oligopoly setting. Indeed, this model is similar to that which we present below. However, in 
the exposition of their model, they choose to focus upon the within-firm complementarity 
between FDI and R&D, the effect of technological spillovers and government policy on FDI, 
and the welfare implications of corporate behaviour. They choose not to extract, describe and   6 
discuss the distinctive motives for FDI present in such a framework, and upon which we will 
focus here. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organised as follows:  the  next  section describes  the 
model; section 3 presents results; a final section offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The model 
Consider the following model. There are two firms – Firm 1 and Firm 2 – that produce 
substitute goods.  The firms compete in two markets: one in country A (the home market); 
and one in country B (the foreign market). Both firms have a production plant in country A 
but must decide whether to serve B with exports or, following FDI, from a new local plant. In 
addition to deciding whether or not to carry out this market-specific investment, each firm 
engages in corporate-wide investment, which lowers its production costs everywhere and/or 
raises  demand  for  the  firm’s  product  everywhere.  This  corporate-wide  investment 
expenditure is:  j k  for Firm j=1,2. There is a three-stage game as follows: in the first stage, 
the firms decide whether or not to carry out FDI; in the second stage, they set their R&D 
levels; and in the third stage, they choose their outputs to be dedicated to each of the two 
markets. At each stage, the firms move simultaneously. 






j eq q x a p - - + = l     j=1,2  and i¹  j          (1) 
where 
A
j q  represents the home market sales of Firm j. The parameter e is an inverse measure 
of product differentiation that takes a value of unity when goods are identical and zero when 
they  are  unrelated.  Investment  affects  demand through  g / 2 j j k x =   (inverting  we  have 
2 /
2
j j x k g =  with the cost of investment determined byg ). The parameter  l  is greater than   7 
zero if a firm’s investment increases consumers’ willingness to pay for the variety produced 






j eq q x a p - - + = l         j=1,2  and i¹  j      (2) 
where 
B
j q  represents the foreign market sales of Firm j. 
Marginal production costs are: 
  j j x c c q - = 0        j=1,2           (3) 
where  0 > q  if the investment is cost reducing, and the higher is  j x  the lower is marginal 




j j q t c q c ) ( + + . If the firm undertakes FDI, it pays a fixed cost, G, and avoids the transport 
costs. It is convenient to use a more compact notation and to define 
i
j c  as marginal cost for 
Firm j=1,2, inclusive of any transport costs, of serving market i=A,B.  Now the profits of 
Firm j can be written as: 
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where I is an indicator variable which is unity when FDI occurs and zero otherwise. The 







j x eq q c a c p ) ( q l + + - - - = -           (5) 
Thus, regardless of whether it is cost-reducing or demand enhancing more investment 
involves higher fixed costs in exchange for a larger price-cost margin in both markets. Thus, 
it  makes  no  qualitative  difference  whether  we  model  investment  as  willingness-to-pay 
augmenting or as cost reducing. Without loss of generality we will set q+l=1.  
For concreteness in the remainder of the exposition of the model, we will assume that 
investment is cost reducing, rather than quality-enhancing, R&D, and reserve comment on 
the  demand-augmenting  investment  case  to  subsequent  discussions  (section  3.4  and   8 
thereafter). Then, since investment does not affect demand, the size of e>0 (the degree of 
product differentiation) has no qualitative impact on results and it will save on notation to set 
e=1. 
  
3.  Results 
In solving the game, we adopt the sub-game perfect equilibrium concept and proceed by 
solving the game backwards, beginning with the third stage decision, that regarding outputs. 
 
3.1  The output choices 
In each market, outputs are set to satisfy the following first-order conditions: 
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        i=A,B and  k ¹  j       (7) 
where  0 c a
A
j - = a   and 
B
j a  depends on the FDI choice of Firm j and its rival (see Table 1). 
------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------ 
3.2  The R&D choices 
In the second stage of the game, each firm chooses its R&D expenditure taking the FDI 
regimes as given. Since there is a one-to-one relationship between R&D expenditure  j k and 
cost  reduction j x ,  we  can  model  the  firm  as  choosing  x  directly.  This  turns  out  to  be 
algebraically simpler. Substituting (6) and (7) into (4), profits net of FDI costs are:   9 
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  k ¹ j    where 
g 9
4
º R       (10) 
R is inversely related to the cost of investment, and is a measure of the effective return on 
R&D. The denominator in (10) is positive from the second-order condition for R&D. Clearly, 
these  reaction  functions  are  negatively  sloped  implying  that  R&D  levels  are  strategic 
substitutes. Firm j’s Nash equilibrium level of cost reduction is: 








j j R R
R
x a a a a + - + -
D
=     k ¹ j      (11) 
where  0 ) 6 1 )( 2 1 ( > - - = D R R . Stability considerations require this to be positive, i.e. we 
require that 6 / 1 < R .  (The cost parameter g  never appears independently of R. It is possible 
to see R as inversely related to cost of R&D and to place restrictions on it directly.) When a 
firm decides to do FDI rather than export the value of 
B
j a  rises by 2t (see Table1) and the 
value of 
B
k a  falls by t. From (10) we can see that this leads to a parallel outward shift of its 
own, and a parallel inward shift of its rival’s, R&D reaction function. From (11) we can see 
how this results in an increase in the R&D investment of the firm that does FDI and a fall in 
the other firm’s R&D.  
The use of (11) in (7) gives the following reduced form expressions for home market 
outputs (
A
j q ) and foreign market outputs (
B
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q a a a a a   i=A,B and  k ¹  j  (12) 
Thus, there is an increase in both the foreign and domestic outputs of a firm that follows from 
a choice to do FDI. 
 
3.3  The FDI choices 
We will now examine the first stage, that in which the firms choose whether or not to engage 
in FDI. Making use of first-order conditions for output, (6), and the first-order conditions for 




j j q q R x + = , allows us to write profits in 
terms of each firm’s own outputs: 
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From (12) it is clear that the outputs depend on the levels of R and  a . Without loss of 
generality we can normalise the home market  0 c a
A
j - = a  as unity. The difference between 
regimes in outputs, and thus also in profits exclusive of FDI costs, is explained by differences 
in the regime specific 
B
j a  levels which in turn depend on transport costs (see Table 1). There 
are  three  exogenous  parameters  in  the  model  G,  t  and  R  –  we  replace  g   with  R  for 
convenience – that will jointly determine the first stage equilibrium outcomes. 
We  will  use  E  to  represent  the  strategy  choice  export  and  M  is  used  to  represent 
strategy choice of a firm that does FDI and thus becomes a multinational. Let 
i
ij P  be the 
profits for Firm i exclusive of FDI costs when Firm i chooses mode of serving the foreign 
market i=E,M and Firm j chooses mode j=E,M. Given that Firm j chooses j=E,M, Firm i 
compares 
i
Ej P  and  G
i
Mj - P  j=E,M  and chooses the one that yields higher profits. Setting 






j G P - P =  j=E,M.    11 
The results are presented graphically in G, t space in Figure 1.  The two thresholds 
divide  the  space  into  three  regions.  In  the  figure,  G  and  t  are  given  as  a  proportion  of 
0 c a - =1. Clearly therefore, t must lie below 0.5 to ensure that all 
B
j a  are positive, and so 
that both firms can profitably serve the foreign market in all circumstances (see Table 1).  In 
the figure, we hold the value of R constant at 0.03. Increases in the level of R will shift the 
threshold loci demarcating the different regions upwards increasing the size of the regions in 
which firms become multinational, but it will not qualitatively affect the diagram.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------- 
3.4  Discussion: Playing away to win at home 
In this model, there is potential for FDI to be critically motivated by its ability to increase 
home market profits. To reveal the extent to which the FDI observed in Figure 1 is thus 
motivated, we must find those combinations of R, G and t for which a firm chooses FDI when 
its foreign market profits would be higher as an exporter. We isolate such combinations in G, 
t space by recalculating the thresholds 
i
j G  disregarding home market profits; the relevant 
parameterisations lie in-between the original and recalculated thresholds (the latter of which 
lie below the former in both cases) and are shaded in Figure 2 – regions (i) and (ii). 
In region (i), if the firms were to ignore the effect of FDI on home profits, the outcome 
would be M,E (or E,M) rather than M,M. This is because, given that its rival chooses FDI, 
the foreign market  profits of a firm (taking account of FDI costs) would be higher if  it 
exported rather than undertook FDI. The firm chooses FDI because, were it to export, its 
home market  profits would  be lower  due to the accompanying differences in  investment 
behaviour – rather than the symmetrical R&D of the M,M outcome, a sole multinational out-
invests its rival in R&D.   12 
In region (ii), if the firms were to ignore the effect of FDI on home profits, the outcome 
would be E,E  rather than M,E (or E,M). This is because, given that its rival chooses to 
export, the foreign market profits of a firm (taking account of FDI costs) would be higher if it 
exported rather than undertook FDI. The firm chooses FDI because, were it to export, its 
home market  profits would  be lower  due to the accompanying differences in  investment 
behaviour – rather than the multinational out-investing its rival in R&D as in the M,E/E,M 
outcome, there is symmetrical R&D in exporting duopoly (E,E). 
The ‘playing away to win at home’ scenario arises because of the effect of a firm’s FDI 
on the investment behaviour of both firms. Thus, there are two mechanisms at work: one is 
the within-firm complementarity between FDI and R&D; the other is the strategic effect of 
FDI  across  firms  which  depresses  the  R&D  of  the  rival.  The  former  derives  from  the 
increased incentive to invest in R&D that accompanies FDI due to a rise in the firm’s total 
output (owing to a lower variable cost of serving the foreign market); the latter derives from 
the decreased incentive to invest in R&D that accompanies a rival’s FDI due to a fall in the 
firm’s  total  output  (owing  to  an  improvement  in  the  relative  position  of  the  rival in  the 
foreign  market).  The effect  of  each  is  to  improve  the  home  (as  well  as  foreign)  market 
position  associated  with  the  FDI  option.  Thus,  with  the  inclusion  of  a  corporate-wide 
investment, the strategic motives for FDI extend to a firm’s home market, where one effect of 
FDI is to reduce the rival’s price-cost margin. 
 
3.5  Discussion: Playing away to win at home and consumer surplus 
It is worth noting the effect on consumer surplus in the home market of the FDI we observe 
that is critically motivated by its positive effect on home market profits. From Figure 1, we 
can see such promotion of FDI: M,M rather than M,E or E,M (region (i) of Figure 2); M,E or 
E,M rather than E,E (region (ii) of Figure 2). These shifts in regime act to augment per-unit   13 
consumer willingness-to-pay and/or depress the variable costs at which the market is served 
in two ways. Firstly, one firm need not incur the per-unit transport cost, t. Secondly, and as a 
result of the first, FDI is associated with greater investment in the corporate-wide asset. This 
is because, as an exporter, a firm invests less than it would as a multinational, ceteris paribus, 
owing to the increased marginal return to investment associated with larger outputs. 
Figure 3 shows consumer surplus (CS) in the home market in equilibrium (represented 
by black lines) across the same range of t shown in Figures 1 and 2. In order to illustrate the 
manner in which CS varies with t not only within, but also between, FDI regimes, we draw 
the figure given a fixed cost of FDI for which we observe all regimes (E,E, M,E/E,M and 
M,M) across the relevant range of t, i.e. G must be sufficiently low for M,M to be observed at 
the highest levels of t. In Figure 3, we see that within regimes CS either falls (as in E,E and 
M,E/E,M) or remains constant (as in M,M) as t rises. Comparing across FDI regimes for t>0, 
the highest level of CS is found under multinational duopoly, M,M, and shifts in regimes 
towards ones exhibiting greater FDI (E,E to M,E/E,M to M,M) tend to be associated with a 
higher level of CS. 
From Figure 3, we can also inspect the effect of playing-away-to-win-at-home FDI on 
CS in the home market. The shaded regions, (i) and (ii), correspond to the identically labelled 
regions in Figure 2. In region (i), both firms choose to undertake FDI in equilibrium (M,M), 
but disregarding the effect of FDI on home market profits, the outcome would instead be M,E 
or E,M. The CS that would be observed in the latter case is indicated by a white line in region 
(i) of Figure 3. In region (ii), one firm chooses to undertake FDI in equilibrium (M,E or E,M), 
but disregarding the effect of FDI on home market profits, the outcome would instead be E,E. 
The CS that would be observed in the latter case is indicated by a white line in region (ii) of 
Figure 3. By comparing the white lines with the black lines in regions (i) and (ii), we observe 
that playing-away-to-win-at-home FDI acts to drive up consumer surplus in the home country   14 
market above the level it otherwise would be. Therefore, FDI thus motivated benefits home 
consumers. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper presents a simple model of the interaction between two rival firms based in the 
same country. Each firm must decide how best to serve a foreign market (export or foreign 
production) and how much to invest in a corporate-wide asset that acts to reduce production 
costs and/or augment the willingness-to-pay for their product. We show that in this scenario, 
the  firms’  foreign  direct  investment  decisions  are  interdependent.  Furthermore,  strategic 
motives for FDI relate not only to a firm’s foreign market profits, but also to those from their 
domestic market. One possibility is that a firm sets up a plant overseas even though its profits 
from serving the foreign market would be higher by exporting. 
As  explained  previously,  the  corporate-wide  investment  need  not  be  exclusively 
interpreted  as  cost-reducing  R&D.  The  results  of  the  model  would  not  be  qualitatively 
different if the investment instead had a positive effect on the demand for the firm’s products. 
For the purposes of our analysis we require the investment to have a corporate-wide effect, 
require a fixed cost, and exert positive and negative influences on the output levels (and 
market shares) of the investing firm and its rival, respectively. Therefore, these results are 
applicable not only to R&D expenditures for cost reduction, but also to R&D that enhances 
product quality. Hence, there are a variety of mechanisms through which the effects of rivals’ 
FDI can be felt in all markets in which they compete, permitting the motive for foreign 
production to reside at home. 
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Notes 
1.  The  title  draws  upon  the  parlance  of  Association  Football  in  the  UK.  For  readers 
unfamiliar with such matters, a corresponding title for followers of American sport 
might be, Home stand sweep secured on a road trip, or more obscurely, Red Sox visit 
Bronx, win at Fenway. 
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Table 1 
  Rival exports  Rival does FDI 
Firm j exports  t c a
B
j - - = 0 a   t c a
B
j 2 0 - - = a  
Firm j does FDI  t c a
B
j + - = 0 a   0 c a
B
j - = a  
   18 
Figure 1 
The  equilibrium  outcomes  regarding  the  mode  of  serving  the 
foreign  market:  exporting  (E)  or  multinational  production 
following FDI (M) – E,E indicates that both firms export; M,E 
and E,M indicate that one firm exports and the other undertakes 
FDI; M,M indicates that both firms undertake FDI. Both G and t 
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Figure 2 
The combinations of G and t, given R, for which a firm chooses to 
undertake FDI when its foreign market profits would be higher as 
an  exporter  are  indicated  by  shaded  regions.  In  region  (i),  the 
equilibrium outcome is M,M; in region (ii), it is M,E or E,M. 
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 Figure 3 
The effect of trade liberalisation on consumer surplus in the home 
country market: The figure shows equilibrium consumer surplus 
(CS;  represented  by  black  lines)  across  the  same  range  of  t 
(measured as a fraction of  0 c a - =1) shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
CS  given  FDI  choices  disregarding  home  market  profits  are 
represented  by  a  white  line  (the  shaded  regions,  (i)  and  (ii), 
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